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RECENT DECISIONS
Sheil goes on to say, "Deny the Fatherhood of God as the one and
only basis for our common brotherhood and you open wide the door to
that racial insanity of the 'SUPER-MAN' and all of the hatred, brutality and violence that follow inevitably in its wake." Our answer to
the problem of restrictive racial covenants will reveal whether we really
love our neighbors, or merely tolerate their existence. America must
recognize and, in recognizing, practice the fact that every man has a
God-given right to exist on a plane equal to his dignity as a child of
God.
In review, therefore, we find that the present law applying the doctrine of restrictive racial covenants is such that it is a violation of the
rights of those persons so discriminated against. With the current
hearing of restrictive covenant cases before the Supreme Court of the
United States, a real opportunity for correction of this evil is presented.
Let us in reaching the proper solution apply the law of God, upon
which our democratic system finds its foundation, and show in practice the heeding of the exhortation of St. Paul who said, "He ... it is
who has made us fit ministers of the new covenant, not of the letter
but of the spirit; for the letter kills, but the spirit gives life." 17
fames D. Sullivan
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uioN-CoN1 _cLr or LAws.-Spietz v. Industrial ComWoRKIf'S Comu
mission et al., - Wis ..... 28 N. W. (2d) 354 (1947)-This was an appeal to re-

view a judgment setting aside an order of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission.
The facts are that Spietz and his employee were residents of Wisconsin; the
employee worked in Montana where he was injured while working, and received
temporary disability payments under Montana law. On returning to Wisconsin,
where the benefits are greater, he applied for and received benefits under the Wisconsin compensation law. These were awarded with credit given for the awards
received in Montana. The question raised is whether the Montana award is a
bar to the Wisconsin award. Does it fall within the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution so that the award in Montana will be considered
res adjudicata?
To answer these questions the Wisconsin court turned to two recent cases deided by the United States Supreme Court with the same factual basis. In Magnolia Petroleum Company Ii. Hunt 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149
(1943), it was held that a final compensation award in one state is entitled to the
protection of the full faith and credit clause. By a Texas statute an award of
compensation was the final and exclusive remedy, and when the employee applied
for Louisiana compensation, the United States Supreme Court held he was not entitled to it. The decision was based on the Texas Workman's Compensation Act,
Art. 8306, Sec. 3. In a similar later case, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v.
McCartin, 330 U. S. 622, 67 S. Ct. 886, 91 L. Ed. 812 (1947), the United States
17

2 Corinthians, chap. 3, verses 6-7.
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Supreme Court held that an award under Illinois law would not bar an award
for the same injury under Wisconsin's compensation act. The only feature which
distinguishes the McCartin case from the Magnolia case seems to be an absence
of a statute in Illinois such as would declare this award the final and exclusive
remedy. Thus it would appear according to the decisions that an award of compensation is not entitled to full faith and credit unless the statute of the first
state which awarded compensation specifically declared that an award is a bar to
further action.
In the Spietz case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on this basis held the second award valid as (1) the Montana award was not final in that an award for
permanent disability in Montana was still open for proceedings and (2) that the
Montana compensation act, unlike that of Texas, did not declare such an award
final.
In the cases previous to the Magnolia case on this problem the United States
Supreme Court had held that for a compensation award to be entitled to full
faith and credit, it must (1) state in the act that this award is to be the exclusive
remedy and (2) the other state involved must not have more than a casual interest in the employee-employer relationship. In the Magnolia case the Supreme Court
held in effect that only the first of these requirements need be met. In that case,
Louisiana, the resident state of the employee, and the state where the contract
of work was made, would appear to have a much greater interest in the outcome
than Texas, where the injury occurred. In the Magnolia case the trend is toward
allowing the awards full faith and credit.
One theory advanced in this reasoning is that when an employee is in a situation where he may elect to apply for one of two awards, his election to proceed
under one will bar proceeding under another and that once the judgment is given
it is res adjudicata and final. This overlooks the fact that the injured employee
seldom knows he is entitled to compensation under two laws and may choose
either. Neither does he know which state gives him the higher award. As pointed
out in 44 COL. L. Rxv. 345 (1944) "election" in many cases is the advice of his
employer.
It might be argued that the full faith and credit clause is observed when credit
is given for the payments in the first state by the second award.
Another interesting question is whether a statute declaring a compensation
award final is on principle entitled to recognition outside the jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of the United States in a five to four decision held in effect that
it was. justice Black in his dissent in the Magnolia case pointed out that the
resident state has an interest in the employee's welfare even though the employee
is injured elsewhere. Thus the barring of the award in the second state because
the law of the first state declares its award to be the only one, is projecting the
law of the first state beyond its jurisdiction. On principle it seems the Magnolia
case extends the full faith and credit clause beyond the breaking point.
This decision by the Wisconsin court was carefully thought out in. the light of
the Magnolia and McCartin cases and followed strictly the principles laid down
in these cases. The rule followed by the federal courts is, substantially, that an
award by a second state will be barred when the compensation act of the first
state declares its award to be final. It might be noted that the Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 403, holds that an award by one state should not
bar a second award.
John Cauley
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WLEs-Com&oN DIsAsTR-INTERPm ATroN op CLAUsES PROVIDING FOR DEATH
IN A ComsLmoN DisAsTmR.
Ross et at. v. Clore et al., __Ind. App-, 74 N. E. (2d)
920 (1947). In the law of wills a common disaster occurs when the testator and
beneficiary die under such circumstances that the chronological order of their
deaths cannot be ascertained. The relative times of death being of great importance in the matter of survivorship, rules have been formulated to deal with
death in a common disaster. Under the common law rule there was no presumption as to survivorship; it was a fact to be proved by the party asserting it.
The civil law rule set up various presumptions as to survivorship between persons
who perished in the same disaster, based upon age, sex, and physical strength of
the individuals, and the assumption that the stronger would survive the weaker.
These presumptions were extended only to parents and children. Where there are
statutes concerning this, survivorship is presumed, as between persons who have.
perished in common disaster, from the probabilities resulting from strength, age
and sex, according to specific rules. 17 C. J. 1179.
In order to prevent controversy, and to insure that the legal presumptions
would not void their wishes, many testators began to include in their wills clauses
designed to foresee and to provide for such a common disaster. Today, with our
ever-increasing dangers to life in automobile, rail and air travel, such provisions
are becoming more and more important.
In this recent case the court was called upon to interpret a common disaster
clause. Ross et al v. Clore et al. The will of the testatrix, after reciting that her
residuary estate, real and personal, was to go to her sister, Ella Snyder, then
read, "In the event my sister Ella Snyder should die in an accident or otherwise
at or about the same time I hereby direct my estate shall go to . . ." The sister

died thirty-five days after the death of the testatrix from an illness which had
existed at the time of the testatrix's death. There would probably be no question in the judge's mind as to the testatrix's intent but for the words, "or about
the same time." It was his belief that these words did not have a sufficiently
definite meaning by themselves or in the clause under consideration. In attempting to find the testatrix's intent from the will as a whole he came to the conclusion that by these words the testatrix meant the bequest to go to her sister
only if the sister should live long enough and be in such a condition to "take or
enjoy" the property.
Now, if indeed the testatrix had the intention ascertained by the court, is not
this intention expressed in terms devoid of the definiteness necessary in order
that any meaning and effect be ascribed to it? Enjoyment is a feeling personal
to each individual and whether it may result from a given act cannot be objectively ascertained as to any one individual.
The New York courts have twice been called upon to construe a common
disaster clause containing the phrase, "at or about the same time." In the more
recent case the court merely decided that the husband who died eleven months
after the death of his wife did not die "at or about the same time. ' In re
Rentall's Will, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 646 (1945). The court in the other case had
before it for construction a common disaster clause worded, "In the event that
my said husband shall not have taken or exercised possession of the property
given to him by my said will and testament... ." The husband survived only five
and one-half months, during which time he distributed some of her property and
paid some of her bills
out of the estate. The court interpreted this clause to mean
that "the testatrix sought to provide against a failure of survivorship and the
death of her husband within a brief interval after her own, during which he would
derive no benefit from her estate." In re Redmond, 100 N. Y. S. 347 (1906). It
was held that the estate had vested in the husband prior to his death. Again
the decision gave importance to the question of whether there was a benefit to
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the husband, although here the substantiation of such an intention was very evident in the will, and thd time of survivorship was much longer. Would it not
be better, if the intention is manifest that in addition to making a provision for
a common disaster it was also intended to provide for some other requirement
such as being able to "take or enjoy" or "benefit from" the estate, that the intention be given effect by the following test, "Did the surviving beneficiary live
long enough in such a condition as to be able to exercise the effective power of
disposition over the estate?" It would seem that this power of disposition would
generally be considered as being accompanied by the idea of enjoyment or a benefit received. Thus the judicially ascertained intent in the two cases would have
been given the definiteness necessary for a proper operation.
In Ross et al. v. Clore et al., the present case, the court, in its construction of
the will, was guided by the cardinal rule that the intention of the testator, as
determined from an examination of the whole will, attributing due weight to all
its language, should be given effect. In re Owen's Estate, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 221
(1945). If, however, the intention of the testator is obscure or ambiguous, resort
must be had to those technical rules applicable to the construction of wills.
Caruthers v. Fisk Univ., 394 Ill. 151, 68 N. E. (2d) 296 (1946). For example,
the application of the ejusdem generis rule to the phrase, "in an accident or otherwise at or about the same time," would seem to indicate that the death contemplate& was to come from some common misfortune or disaster, perhaps even
from a common fatal illness. In re Astor's Estate, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 117 (1946).
Then too, in the principal case, there is no mention made of the date of the will.
This fact becomes important if the court is to put itself, as nearly as possible,
in the circumstances of the testatrix in order to determine her intention. Anderson v. Harris, 320 Mass. 101, 67 N. E. (2d) 670 (1946). In the decisions herein
discussed the courts have ignored the fact that the law so favors the vesting of
estates and is so averse to the postponement thereof, that they will be held to
vest at the earliest possible period, in the absence of clear manifestation of the
intention of the testator to the contrary. Geiger v. Geer et al., 395 Ill. 367, 69
N. E. (2d) 848 (1946). It seems quite evident in Ross et ol. v. Clore et al. that
the vesting of the estate is suspended until the death of the testatrix.
Thus in dealing with this particular method of expression in a common disaster clause, these two courts have established a dangerous precedent. They have
permitted the vesting of estates to be suspended almost indefinitely, for they have
limited the period of suspension only by the most general terms. If their test
will admit the suspension of vesting for thirty-five days in one case, the same
general test could easily permit six months or one year or even longer as a reasonable time in other cases.
Robert D. Lonergan

UNITED STATES-ToRT LrILBrrY oF Govmwxim T ConPoa.ATioNs.-National
Housing Agency et al. v. Orton, ..- Tex. Civ. App...., 202 S. W. (2d) 243 (1946).
Extension of government immunity from suit to government corporations is
against public policy, and will not be implied. In the absence of Congressional
consent, the functions of a government corporation must be of an essentially public character before immunity will be inferred. Accordingly, a provision in a
statute allowing a government corporation to sue or be sued was held to apply
to a suit in tort against another corporation derived from it.
This was an action for personal injuries brought by William T. Orton against
the United States Housing Authority, the Federal Public Housing Authority, and
the National Housing Agency. A verdict was obtained by the plaintiff in the
trial court and the defendants appealed.
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The plaintiff was employed as a nightwatchman in a men's dormitory operated by the FPHA in Orange, Texas, as a home for war plant workers. While
engaged in his duties, he fell and received the injuries of which he complained.
The dormitory in which the plaintiff was employed was built by the Farm Security Administration, but, before the injury occurred, it was transferred to the
FPHA. Notice was served on the representative of all the appellants in Texas,
while a non-resident notice was issued to the appellants' offices in Washington, D.
C. Appellants filed a motion to quash and dismiss which was overruled. The
jury having found the accident was due to the appellants' negligence in failing to
repair a faulty stairway, the trial judge determined that FPHA and USHA were
the same agency, operating under the supervision of the NHA, and allowed recovery against both. Appellants contended that USHA and FPHA were not the
same agency and that FPHA, which had admitted control over the dormitory, was
immune from suit.
The court held that USHA and FPHA had been merged by Executive Order
9070, 50 U. S. C. A. App. Sec. 601 note, and that the agency FPHA (USHA)
was thereby created. Since The United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U. S. C. A.
See. 1405 (a) and (b), had conferred the power to sue and be sued on USHA,
the court felt that this power was to be extended to FPHA (USHA), at least
in exercising the duties of USHA. In considering the question of the public or
governmental nature of the duties of FPHA (USHA), the court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Board, 258 U. S.
549, 42 S. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762 (1931). There, in holding the Emergency Fleet
Corporation liable for suit, he said, "An instrumentality of government he might
be, and for the greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease
to be answerable for his acts." The court did not attempt to decide what governmental functions should be considered immune, but did say that, excepting clear
cases of immunity, the "consent to be sued should be extended to any function
lawfully performed by the corporation."
The line between governmental and commercial functions has not been too
clearly drawn. Some cases have held government-owned corporations immune
from suit where they performed commercial functions for the public good. Balliane v. Alaska N. R. Co., 259 F. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) (homesteading and hauling government coal); Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Alabama State Bridge Corp., 59
F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); rehearing denied 1932, 59 F. (2d) 1065; writ of
certiorari denied 1932, 287 U. S. 644, 50 S. Ct. 90, 77 L. Ed. 557 road and bridge
building). On the other hand, the court in the principal case had authority for its
decision upholding the right to maintain a suit in tort where a general right to
sue and be sued has been granted. It cited the leading case of Kiefer & Kiejer v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939).
However, there are earlier cases where a Federal agency has been held not liable
in tort, even though given the right to sue and be sued, on the theory that it was
not authorized to commit torts. Overholser v. National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, 68 Ohio St. 236, 67 N. E. 487, 96 Am. St. Rep. 658 (1903);
Walker v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 25 F. Supp, 589 (S. D. Calif. 1938). The
Kiefer case, however, can be considered to have overruled them in respect to
commercial functions of governmental corporations at least.
The appellants in the instant case also contended that the plaintiff should not
have been able to maintain this suit because he had a right to compensation under
the U. S. Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U. S. C. A. Chapter 15 (1916). This
contention was overruled by the court as being a misstatement of the law. Where
one has two remedies, he is free to pursue either, even if both are against the
United States. Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. 421, 42 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696 (1922).
If one remedy is pursued to completion, however, the other cannot be used.
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The appellants' last major contention was that Amiss, their representative in
Texas, was not an agent of USHA and that FPHA and NHA were nonresidents
and had not been served within the state. The court answered by stating that the
right of FPHA (USHA) to make a general appearance could be inferred from its
right to be sued, and that the filing of the motion to quash and dismiss had,
under the court's rules of procedure, the effect of a general appearance. Rules
121, 122, 123, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 1939 Supp.
While this case was decided after the passage of the Tort Claims Act of 1946,
28 U. S. C. A. Secs. 921-946 inclusive, the action accrued before January 1, 1945,
the effective date of the act. Under this law, all tort claims against suable government agencies must be tried by the federal district judge of the district where
the action occurred, sitting without a jury. In such cases, the substantive law
of the place where it is tried is followed, while the case is conducted according
to the Federal Rules of Procedure.
The court also reiterated the established rule that costs can be adjudged
against a government corporation not having immunity from suit.
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 61 S. Ct. 485, 85 L. Ed.
S95 (1941).
The modem growth of government corporations and agencies, particularly during the war years, and the consequent increase in litigation, is resulting in a
clearer definition of the law of governmental immunity from suit. The fundamental principles have been declared, but the diverse statutory origins of these
corporations have made general application difficult. In each case, the court
must weigh the intent of Congress as well as the rules of law in delivering a decision. Frequently, considerations of public policy will have a great influence on
the courts. The trend in the law today is to put government corporations on an
equal footing with the private corporations with which they compete. The law
on this point, however, will probably never be settled as long as our ideas of the
functions and duties of government continue to change.
John H. O'Hara

INTERNATIONAL LAw-Er

or WIL

LEAVING PROPERTY 3H CAx.'oiN-A

To

GaamAN NATIoNAl-Clark v. Allen, ....U. S_.., 67 Sup. Ct. 1431, 91 L. Ed. 1285
(1947). Alvina Wagner, a resident of California, died in 1942, and, under a will
dated December 23, 1941, admitted to probate in a California court in 1942, bequeathed her real and personal property to four relatives who were nationals and
residents of Germany. Six nieces and nephews, residents of California, petitioned
for distribution of the estate, claiming that, under a California Statute (1941),
Probate Code, Section 259, 259.1, and 259.2, the right of aliens abroad to take
real or personal property in the United States by will or descent is conditioned
upon the existence of a reciprocal right of Americans abroad, and in the absence
of such reciprocal right the American heirs are entitled to the property. However,
the Alien Property Custodian asserted that the property was vested in him, inasmuch as the California statute was void because it conflicted with the Constitution
of the United States by invading the field of foreign affairs. The heirs then
claimed that Article IV of the German-American Treaty of 1925, relied upon by
the Alien Property Custodian, was abrogated or suspended by the war with Germany. A judgment was rendered in the district court for the Alien Property Custodian, Attorney General Tom Clark, who had instituted this action against the
testator's executor and California heirs at law, but the circuit court of appeals
reversed the decision. On appeal of the Alien Property Custodian the Supreme
Court granted certiorari for a determination of his interest in the testator's property based upon the effectiveness of the treaty, during hostilities, and the state
statute.
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There are two questions involved' here: (1) Did the outbreak of the war between the United States and Germany break, suspend or abrogate the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, signed on December
8, 1923 and proclaimed on October 14, 1925, 44 Stat. 2132, (2) Will a state
statute prohibit an enemy alien from inheriting property when he has that right
by treaty provision?
There is a diversity of opinion on the first question and little judicial precedent. Lenoir, The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties (1946) 34 GEo. L. J.129.
In fact the Supreme Court has only dealt with two previous cases in this regard:
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 5 L. Ed.
662 (1823). Karnuth v. United States, 279 U. S.231, 173 Sup. Ct. 677, 49 L. Ed.
274 (1929). Three schools of thought exist. One believes that war annuls all
treaties. Another believes that war does not annul any treaties, that natural
rights are preserved in war along with the legal system. Though the nations may
be at war, the rights of individuals still continue. The Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) indicated this when the Reporter said, "There
is no reason of public policy or national defense why any treaties should be regarded as ipso facto annulled or terminated by the outbreak of war between the
parties." 29 Am. J. Int. L. (Supp) 1185-1186. Finally, there are the many
writers who look into the "intent" of the parties drawing the treaties. Lenoir says,
"The chief virtue of the 'intent of the parties' test seems to be that it provides
a logical basis from which to argue for or against survival of a particular treaty
provision upon the outbreak of war." 34 Gao. L. J. 129x 173.
In the outstanding American case, Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 242, 128
N. E. 185, 191 (1920), Judge Cardozo formulated the principle that, during hostilities, if the treaty or its provisions were not annulled by the governments the
compatible provisions were enforceable and the incompatible provisions were unenforceable. He stated: "International law today does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the effects produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, perserving or annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes
standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules. When it attempts to do more,
it finds that there is neither unanimity of opinion nor uniformity of practice..."
Professor Hyde criticized this opinion by saying, "It may be observed that the
'principle' invoked fails to take cognizance of the fact that the contracting parties
may have been, and probably were, quite unwilling to agree that the continuance
of a privilege such as that of taking land by descent should be dependent upon
the circumstance that the exercise of it was not impracticable after the outbreak
of hostilities." 2 Hyde, International Law (2d ed. 1945), Section 550, note 7.
The treaty was considered in effect in the Techt v. Hughes case, as the government had not suspended or annulled it, and the provisions were compatible with
the state of hostilities. So too in the instant case. Whether the treaty was abrogated by the fact that the German government had ceased to exist was held to
be a political and not a judicial question. The United States did not suspend or
annul the treaty by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. (1917), as amended by the First War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 839 (1941). Therefore, said Mr. Justice Douglas, the outbreak of war does not necessarily suspend or abrogate treaty
provisions and "they prevail over any requirements of California law which conflict with them." Courts of a number of European states and this country support this view that war does not affect reciprocal inheritance treaty provisions.
Sutton v. Sutton, 1 Russ. & M. 663, 39 Eng. Rep. 255 (Ch. 1830); State ex rel
Minor v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 Pac. 158 (1926); Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb.
750, 223 N. W. 13 (1929).
Judge Cardozo has wisely stated that,

"

. .

while war is still flagrant, and the

will of the political departments of the government unrevealed, the courts . .
play a humbler and more cautious part. It is not for them to denounce treaties
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generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as one provision or another is involved in
some actual controversy before them, to determine whether, alone, or by force
of connection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the
policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war, and hence presumably
intended to be limited to time of peace." Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 243.
128 N. E. 185, 192 (1920).
The instant case indicates a trend toward recognition of the individual's rights,
even during warfare. For, if nations find themselves pitted against one another
in warfare, there should be no sacrifice of the individual's rights, which cannot
be taken away by anyone or any nation. War may find the rights abused, but
the rights cannot be removed.
As to the second question the Court distinguishes between the disposition of
inherited realty and personalty as provided for by the treaty.
The treaty in question provides that any person holding realty in the United
States may leave it to a German heir. The heir is then allowed a three-year period,
and longer if necessary, to sell the property and withdraw the proceeds. This
will be done "without restraint or interference, and exempt from any succession,
probate or administrative duties or charges other than those which may be imposed in like cases upon the nationals of the country from which such proceeds
may be drawn," according to Article IV of the treaty.
As to personalty Article IV contains this provision: "Nationals of either High
Contracting Party may have full power to dispose of their personal property of
every kind within the territories of the other, by testament, donation, or otherwise, and their heirs, legatees and donees, of whatsoever nationality, whether resident or non-resident, shall succeed to such personal property, and may take possession thereof, either by themselves or by others acting for them, and retain or
dispose of the same at their pleasure subject to the payment of such duties or
charges only as the nationals of the High Contracting Party within whose territories such property may be or belong shall be liable to pay in like cases." If
Alvina Wagner is determined to be a German national the treaty would ther
govern, but she was assumed to be an American citizen and the Court found that
the treaty made no provision for the personalty of an American citizen in this
country to be left to German nationals. Even though the personalty could not
be disposed of under the treaty it was argued that neither could it be disposed
of under the California statute, which was claimed to be unconstitutional on the
grounds of a state extension of power into the field of foreign affairs, a federal
function. The Court held that state law determines the rights of succession to
property and are effective so long as they do not conflict with a federal policy,
such as a treaty. Here the treaty does not govern the rights of succession.
Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in part, dissented on the Court's assumption
of Wagner's nationality and the expression of the constitutionality of the Callfornia statute. He stated, "The decision now made on that issue, by virtue of
the Court's hypothesizing that she was an American citizen, will be rendered
both moot and advisory in character if it is found, as it may well be in the
District Court's further proceedings, that she was a German national. . . . It is
more important that constitutional decisions be reserved until the issues calling
for them are squarely and inescapably presented, factually as well as legally, than
it is to expedite the termination of litigation of the procedural convenience of the
parties."
Robert R. Uhl

